Stratfor and Rosalind Russell

This Stratfor article examines the implications of the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan in an airstrike in Yeman this week.

The U.S. born al-Awlaki was the Al Qaeda spokesperson who speared-headed their attempts at outreach and recruitment of English speaking Moslems; while Khan, also American born, was the editor of their English language magazine Inspire.

Scott Stewart believes their deaths will greatly diminish al Qeada's efforts to radicalize English speaking Moslems. The ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki was charismatic as well as familiar with American culture, while Khan was a very talented magazine designer and editor.

Since the article discussed publishing Howard Hawk's screwball comedy His Gal Friday naturally came to mind, and so Rosalind Russell, who played the reporter Hildegard 'Hildy' Johnson in the film, get the honors as the article's Hot Stratfor Babe.

Rosalind Russell extracted herself from an early contract at Universal and moved on to MGM. She didn't want to play the sophisticated leading-lady, and managed to work herself into a long career as a comedienne. 

His Girl Friday is one of her better films. As the above linked review describes the movie, "it [is] best remembered for its overlapping dialogue and simultaneous conversations, rapid-fire delivery, breakneck speed, word gags, sexual innuendo, plot twists, "in" jokes, mugging, jousting, sarcastic insults, frantic pace and farcical script. With its plot about a ruthless editor, a marriage renewed by divorce and the threat of re-marriage, a politically corrupt city, and a questionable judicial system, the romantic comedy is both a love story and a sophisticated battle of the sexes (and duel of wits)." 

As a bonus, after the article, I've included a clip from the film that gives you a feel for its comedy. If you haven't seen it, it is an entertaining film and well worth watching.


YEMEN: FALLOUT FROM THE AL-AWLAKI AIRSTRIKE
By Scott Stewart, October 6, 2011

U.S.-born Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, an ideologue and spokesman for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaeda's franchise in Yemen, was killed in a Sept. 30 airstrike directed against a motorcade near the town of Khashef in Yemen's al-Jawf province. The strike, which occurred at 9:55 a.m. local time, reportedly was conducted by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and may have also involved fixed-wing naval aircraft. Three other men were killed in the strike, one of whom was Samir Khan, the creator and editor of AQAP's English-language magazine  Inspire.

Al-Awlaki has been targeted before; in fact, he had been declared dead on at least two occasions. The first time followed a December 2009 airstrike in Shabwa province, and the second followed a May 5 airstrike, also in Shabwa. In light of confirmation from the U.S. and Yemeni governments and from statements made by al-Awlaki's family members, it appears that he is indeed dead this time. We anticipate that AQAP soon will issue an official statement confirming the deaths of al-Awlaki and Khan.

As STRATFOR noted Sept. 30, the deaths of both al-Awlaki and Khan can be expected to greatly hamper AQAP's efforts to radicalize and equip English-speaking Muslims. The group may have other native English speakers, but individuals who possess the charisma and background of al-Awlaki or the graphics and editorial skills of Khan are difficult to come by in Yemen. The al Qaeda franchise's English-language outreach is certain to face a significant setback.

This deaths of al-Awlaki and Khan and the impact their deaths will have on AQAP's outreach efforts provide an opportunity to consider the importance of individuals -- and their personal skill sets -- to militant organizations, especially organizations seeking to conduct transnational media and ideological operations.

Bridging the Gap Between Militant Ideology and Operations

When considering militant groups with transnational objectives and reach such as AQAP, we need to recognize that there are several components necessary for such groups to conduct successful operations, including finances, logistics, planning, training and intelligence. But at a higher level, there is also the distinction between those elements of the group that are dedicated to operations on the physical battlefield and those who are focused on operations on the ideological battlefield. While physical operations are important for obvious reasons, the ideological component is also critically important because it allows a group to recruit new members, maintain the ideological commitment of those already in the group and help shape public perception through propaganda. Because of this, the ideological component is especially important for the long-term viability and continuity of a group or movement.

Groups such as the al Qaeda core and AQAP appreciate the importance of the ideological struggle. Published three days before the airstrike against Khan and al-Awlaki, the seventh edition of Inspire contains an article written by Khan titled "The Media Conflict," wherein he quotes AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahayshi (aka Abu Basir) as stating, "media work is half of the jihad."

The role of the media in propagating militant ideology has been revolutionized by the Internet, which allows small groups in remote corners of the globe to produce and broadcast material that is almost instantly available to people all around the world. Indeed, jihadists have succeeded in radicalizing and recruiting people from disparate countries. Products such as Inspire or the video and audio recordings of militant leaders such as al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri are a giant leap forward from the way militants communicated 25 years ago, when groups like November 17 would send communiques to the newspapers and Hezbollah would release videos via major television networks of Western hostages they had kidnapped.

Interestingly, militant groups quickly recognized the significance of this media democratization and were early adopters of the Internet. By the mid-1990s, white supremacists in the United States had established Stormfront.com, and in 1996, jihadists inaugurated azzam.com, a professional-looking website that allowed them to provide inspiration, news and instruction to adherents to their ideology and to potential recruits. Azzam.com eventually became an important mechanism through which funds for jihadist groups could be raised and willing volunteers could find ways to link up with jihadist groups in places like Afghanistan, Chechnya and Bosnia. [continued after the jump]

Stratfor and Rachel Weisz

This Stratfor article returns to Yeman to further discuss that country's disintegrating situation. The breakdown in Yeman is providing an opening for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) which greatly complicates the U.S. and Saudi response to the crisis. 

If you missed it, be sure to read the earlier Startfor Yeman article for more context on the situation. 


Sticking with the Hot Stratfor Babe selection criteria of the earlier Yeman article, I looked at movies that had deserts in them and settled on Rachel Weisz of the Mummy movies for the honor. Yes, you don't think of temple complexes and mummies when you think of Yeman, but a desert is a desert and and so the locale will do just fine as a stand-in. 

Rachel plays Evelyn 'Evy' Carnahan, a klutzy librarian who doubles as an Egyptologist, er... I mean Yemantologist. She hooks up with the slightly disreputable Rick O'Connell, played by Brendan Fraiser, and over the course of the Mummy movies they manage to keep releasing an ancient mummy that threatens to destroy the world. As silly as they are, the Mummy movies are entertaining, popcorn munching fun to watch. 


ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN A PRE- AND POST-SALEH YEMEN
By Reva Bhalla, April 21, 2011

Nearly three months have passed since the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, first saw mass demonstrations against Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, but an exit from the current stalemate is still nowhere in sight. Saleh retains enough support to continue dictating the terms of his eventual political departure to an emboldened yet frustrated opposition. At the same time, the writ of his authority beyond the capital is dwindling, which is increasing the level of chaos and allowing various rebel groups to collect arms, recruit fighters and operate under dangerously few constraints.

The prospect of Saleh's political struggle providing a boon to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is understandably producing anxiety in Washington, where U.S. officials have spent the past few months trying to envision what a post-Saleh Yemen would mean for U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the Arabian Peninsula.

While fending off opponents at home, Saleh and his followers have been relying on the "me or chaos" tactic abroad to hang onto power. Loyalists argue that the dismantling of the Saleh regime would fundamentally derail years of U.S. investment designed to elicit meaningful Yemeni cooperation against AQAP or, worse, result in a civil war that will provide AQAP with freedom to hone its skills. Emboldened by the recent unrest, a jihadist group called the Abyan-Aden Islamic Army launched a major raid on a weapons depot in Ja'ar in late March, leading a number of media outlets to speculate that the toppling of the Saleh regime would play directly into the hands of Yemen's jihadists.

Meanwhile, the opposition has countered that the Yemeni jihadist threat is a perception engineered by Saleh to convince the West of the dangers of abandoning support for his regime. Opposition figures argue that Saleh's policies are what led to the rise of AQAP in the first place and that the fall of his regime would provide the United States with a clean slate to address its counterterrorism concerns with new, non-Saleh-affiliated political allies. The reality is likely somewhere in between.

The Birth of Yemen's Modern Jihadist Movement

The pervasiveness of radical Islamists in Yemen's military and security apparatus is no secret, and it contributes to the staying power of al Qaeda and its offspring in the Arabian Peninsula. The root of the issue dates back to the Soviet-Afghan war, when Osama bin Laden, whose family hails from the Hadramout region of the eastern Yemeni hinterland, commanded a small group of Arab volunteers under the leadership of Abdullah Azzam in the Islamist insurgency against the Soviets through the 1980s. Yemenis formed one of the largest contingents within bin Laden's Arab volunteer force in Afghanistan, which meant that by 1989, a sizable number of battle-hardened Yemenis returned home looking for a new purpose.

They did not have to wait long. Leading the jihadist pack returning from Afghanistan was Tariq al Fadhli of the once-powerful al Fadhli tribe based in the southern Yemeni province of Abyan. Joining al Fadhli was Sheikh Abdul Majid al Zindani, the spiritual father of Yemen's Salafi movement and one of the leaders of the conservative Islah party (now leading the political opposition against Saleh). The al Fadhli tribe had lost its lands to the Marxists of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), which had ruled South Yemen with Soviet backing throughout the 1980s while North Yemen was ruled with Saudi backing. Al Fadhli, an opportunist who tends to downplay his previous interactions with bin Laden, returned to his homeland in 1989 (supposedly with funding from bin Laden) with a mission backed by North Yemen and Saudi Arabia to rid the south of Marxists. He and his group set up camp in the mountains of Saada province on the Saudi border and also established a training facility in Abyan province in South Yemen. Joining al Fadhli's group were a few thousand Arabs from Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan who had fought in Afghanistan and faced arrest or worse if they tried to return home. [continued after jump]