In today's Stratfor article Friedman discusses strategic reason why he thinks the 1967 borders may be the best choice for Isreal. I didn't find his arguments convincing. In particular, his claim that because they won their earlier wars, but struggled in their later wars, that meant that the 67 borders made more strategic sense seemed like a leap in logic to me. Still, it is an interesting read as always.
Shrinking Israel to that very narrow waist conjured up images of a sort of national anorexia. Of course, anorexia immediately brings to mind supermodels and so there would be the source of this article's Hot Stratfor babe.
Needless to say, I had a wealth of subjects to choose from and it was quite the task narrowing it down to just one. After arduous research I selected Twiggy as the Hot Strafor Babe because she is the first model I remember who marketed her skinniness as part of her appeal.
Twiggy was born Lesley Hornby in 1959 (a little over a year after the founding of Israel). Her big break came when, at the age of 16, a hair dresser cut her hair short and hung pictures of her in his salon to promote the style. A fashion photographer saw the pictures, took more, and they became her entrance into the modeling field.
Along with modeling, she's cranked out albums and done quite a bit of acting. As a bonus, after the Strafor article, I've embedded a video featuring a number of slides of her posing in various goofy mod outfits with I Feel Fine by the Beatles as the background music.
ISRAEL'S BORDERS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
By George Friedman, May 31, 2011
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said May 30 that Israel could not prevent the United Nations from recognizing a Palestinian state, in the sense of adopting a resolution on the subject. Two weeks ago, U.S. President Barack Obama, in a speech, called on Israel to return to some variation of its pre-1967 borders. The practical significance of these and other diplomatic evolutions in relation to Israel is questionable. Historically, U.N. declarations have had variable meanings, depending on the willingness of great powers to enforce them. Obama's speech on Israel, and his subsequent statements, created enough ambiguity to make exactly what he was saying unclear. Nevertheless, it is clear that the diplomatic atmosphere on Israel is shifting.
There are many questions concerning this shift, ranging from the competing moral and historical claims of the Israelis and Palestinians to the internal politics of each side to whether the Palestinians would be satisfied with a return to the pre-1967 borders. All of these must be addressed, but this analysis is confined to a single issue: whether a return to the 1967 borders would increase the danger to Israel's national security. Later analyses will focus on Palestinian national security issues and those of others.
Early Borders
It is important to begin by understanding that the pre-1967 borders are actually the borders established by the armistice agreements of 1949. The 1948 U.N. resolution creating the state of Israel created a much smaller Israel. The Arab rejection of what was called "partition" resulted in a war that created the borders that placed the West Bank (named after the west bank of the Jordan River) in Jordanian hands, along with substantial parts of Jerusalem, and placed Gaza in the hands of the Egyptians.
The 1949 borders substantially improved Israel's position by widening the corridors between the areas granted to Israel under the partition, giving it control of part of Jerusalem and, perhaps most important, control over the Negev. The latter provided Israel with room for maneuver in the event of an Egyptian attack -- and Egypt was always Israel's main adversary. At the same time, the 1949 borders did not eliminate a major strategic threat. The Israel-Jordan border placed Jordanian forces on three sides of Israeli Jerusalem, and threatened the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor. Much of the Israeli heartland, the Tel Aviv-Haifa-Jerusalem triangle, was within Jordanian artillery range, and a Jordanian attack toward the Mediterranean would have to be stopped cold at the border, since there was no room to retreat, regroup and counterattack.
For Israel, the main danger did not come from Jordan attacking by itself. Jordanian forces were limited, and tensions with Egypt and Syria created a de facto alliance between Israel and Jordan. In addition, the Jordanian Hashemite regime lived in deep tension with the Palestinians, since the former were British transplants from the Arabian Peninsula, and the Palestinians saw them as well as the Israelis as interlopers. Thus the danger on the map was mitigated both by politics and by the limited force the Jordanians could bring to bear.
Nevertheless, politics shift, and the 1949 borders posed a strategic problem for Israel. If Egypt, Jordan and Syria were to launch a simultaneous attack (possibly joined by other forces along the Jordan River line) all along Israel's frontiers, the ability of Israel to defeat the attackers was questionable. The attacks would have to be coordinated -- as the 1948 attacks were not -- but simultaneous pressure along all frontiers would leave the Israelis with insufficient forces to hold and therefore no framework for a counterattack. From 1948 to 1967, this was Israel's existential challenge, mitigated by the disharmony among the Arabs and the fact that any attack would be detected in the deployment phase. [continues after jump]
The burning Of St. Mary's church in Obama's Egypt
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