Stratfor and Bridget Fonda

In this Stratfor article George Friedman begins by discussing the Greek vote. He points out that it was very closely split between the EU friendly parties and those against austerity. For that reason it may not even be possible for the Greeks to form a new government of any durability.

The French vote for the Socialist Hollande, who is in direct opposition to the German government bailout plans, reinforces the deep split between the backers of stimulus and the backers of deficit control through austerity programs.

There likely is not a clean way of resolving that difference, and that does not bode well for Europe in the short and medium time frame.

The beginning of the article is excerpted below, with a link to the entire article at the end of the excerpt.

For the article's Hot Stratfor Babe I turned to women battling on the silver screen and came up with the movie Single White Female. Of the two female leads in that movie I selected Bridget Fonda for the honor.

In the movie Fonda plays Allison, a successful woman who advertising for a room mate and ends up selecting the mousey Hedra, who turns out to be a complete nutbag. Hedra gradually co-opts Allison's life, dressing like her and cutting her hair the same and so forth. I've never seen the film, so I don't know exactly what happens, but I assume that there is a murderous rampage towards the end, but maybe not.

Ms Fonda always struck me as being a rather pedestrian actress. Her grandfather is Henry Fonda, her father is Peter Fonda and her aunt is Jane Fonda so I assume -- although I'm sure she would rebel at the notion -- that more than one door swung open for her because of her family. She had a busy career until she retired from acting in 2002. 
   

The Futility of European Elections
By George Friedman, June 19, 2012

Europe and the financial markets watched intently June 17 as Greece held general elections. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Francois Hollande and Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti all delayed their flights to the June 18 G-20 summit in Mexico to await the results.

The two leading contenders in the elections were the center-right New Democracy Party (ND), which pledged to uphold Greece's commitments to austerity and honor the country's financial agreements with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, and the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), a group of far-left politicians who pledged to reject Greece's existing agreements, end austerity and maintain the country's position in the eurozone. A third major party, the center-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), shares the ND's position of maintaining Greece's bailout agreement. PASOK had been Greece's ruling party until it formed a unity government with the ND late in 2011.

For a while it seemed these elections would be definitive. Either Greece would reject the country's agreement with its international lenders, potentially being forced out of the eurozone, or it wouldn't. If Greece rejected austerity and forcibly or voluntarily left the eurozone, the country might set a precedent for other troubled states and precipitate a financial crisis -- a eurozone exit and default would likely go hand in hand. Europe would be tested as never before, and it would find out how resilient it is to a wider financial crisis.

But in Europe, the least likely outcome is a definitive one. ND won the election with about 29.5 percent of the vote, earning 78 seats in parliament plus another 50 seats awarded to the winning party by the Greek Constitution. SYRIZA received roughly 27.1 percent of the vote, equivalent to 72 seats, and PASOK received roughly 12.2 percent of the vote, or about 33 seats. The rest of the vote was scattered among a host of other parties. A party needs 151 seats to gain an absolute majority in parliament, but since no single party passed that threshold, a governing coalition must be formed. So the ND needs PASOK if it is going to cobble together a governing coalition, but PASOK has said it will not join a coalition without SYRIZA. It is unclear what a coalition would look like between a party that wants to respect the bailout agreement and a party that wants to reject it, but such a coalition is unlikely to happen anyway. SYRIZA wants to form a powerful opposition. Something resembling a government eventually will be assembled regardless of current rhetoric.

The Greek vote has settled nothing. In fact, it may not even lead to the formation of a government; the last election failed to produce a government and forced this election. That the European crisis most severely affected a country so politically fractious could be seen as pitiable. On the other hand, one could argue that the crisis inevitably would be most severe in the most divided country -- not because the divisions caused the crisis, but because the crisis caused the divisions.

The pressure brought on by the circumstances in Greece undermined whatever political order was in place; the choices for policymakers were so limited and so frightening that coherent responses were difficult. Greece has options, but it is unable to choose one. More than anything, Europe wants a decision on its future, whatever that decision might be. On June 17, Greece disappointed Europe not because of the choice it made but because it was crippled with indecision.

Crisis Management

Greece's indecisions are at the ground level of Europe. Another and more significant framework for indecision is emerging in Franco-German relations. The French Socialist Party won an absolute majority the same day that the Greeks entered another gridlock. This makes it possible for France's Socialists to form a government without the Greens, giving Hollande a strong and coherent platform from which to operate.

France's position on managing the sovereign debt crisis differs fundamentally from Germany's. Germany has said it will not agree to proposed solutions that would essentially turn the eurozone into a transfer union until the rest of Europe can balance their budgets through austerity measures. Germany believes this must be the first step to further EU and eurozone integration. Hollande takes a different position. He, too, wants greater European and eurozone integration. However, Hollande advocates economic stimulus alongside austerity measures as a means to rebalance the finances of European governments.

Hollande wants to grow Europe out of its financial problems. This means stimulating economies, a process that requires deficit spending. Hollande upholds a traditional Keynesian tenet that increasing demand for goods among consumers will increase economic activity and increase investment. As a Socialist with a strong leftist contingent in his party, Hollande cannot support the German position, which constrains the economy, particularly by decreasing government expenditures, thereby depressing consumption.

The difference between the French and German approaches is substantial. It reveals a dispute at the heart of the European strategy for managing the crisis. The Germans have been aggressive in demanding balanced budgets. The French are becoming equally aggressive in demanding expansionary policies. Both want to avoid defaults, but the Germans want to guarantee payments of debt by a combination of bailout and austerity. The French want to add stimulus to this, which changes the situation entirely because the stimulus would be funded in large part by German coffers.

Read more: The Futility of European Elections | Stratfor

Stratfor and Pilar López de Ayala

In this Stratfor article Frriedman discusses the ongoing EU crisis as it moves on to the economic problems and bailout of Spain.

As he points out there was much less political posturing with the Spanish bailout than the earlier Greek drama. Friedman thinks this is just adjusting to the process of the crisis, rather than addressing the underlying crisis itself.

He then discusses the EU developing mechanism of further European integration via an EU Finance Minister. The problem with this approach is that it cedes national control of budgets, and with it sovereignty, to Germany's and Brussel's bureaucrats. Whether the European public will except such integration is a question that remains to be answered.

The beginning of the article is excerpted below, with a link to the entire article at the end of the excerpt.

For the article's Hot Stratfor Babe I looked to Spanish actresses and, after carefully weighing the pros and cons of each, I finally selected Pilar López de Ayala for the honor.

I don't know much about Ms de Ayala. in fact, truth be told, I don't know anything about her outside of the fact she appears to be a successful Spanish actress. I actually chose her because she had one of those long Spanish names that amuses Americans for some odd reason.


Spain, Debt and Sovereignty
By George Friedman, June 12, 2012

Eurozone countries on June 9 agreed to lend Spain up to 100 billion euros ($125 billion) to stabilize the Spanish banking system. Because the bailout dealt with Spain's financial sector directly rather than involving the country's sovereign debt, Madrid did not face the kind of demands for more onerous austerity measures in exchange for the loan that have led to political instability in countries such as Greece.

There are two important aspects to this. First, yet another European financial problem has emerged requiring concerted action. Second, unlike previous incidents, this bailout was not accompanied by much melodrama, infighting or politically destabilizing threats. The Europeans have not solved the underlying problems that have led to these periodic crises, but they have now calibrated their management of the situation to minimize drama and thereby limit political fallout. The Spanish request for help without conditions, and the willingness of the Europeans to provide it, moves the European process to a new level. In a sense, it is a capitulation to the crisis.

This is a shift in the position of Europe's creditor nations, particularly Germany. Berlin has realized that it has no choice but to fund this and other bailouts. As an export-dependent country, Germany needs the eurozone to be able to buy German products. Moreover, Berlin cannot allow internal political pressures to destabilize the European Union as a whole. For all the German bravado about expelling countries, the preservation and even expansion of the existing system remains a fundamental German interest. The cycle of threats, capitulation by creditors, political unrest and then German accommodation had to be broken. It was not only failing to solve the crisis but also contributing to the eurozone's instability. In Spain, the Germans shifted their approach, resolving the temporary problem without a fight over more austerity.

The problem with the solution is that it does nothing to deal with the larger dilemma of European sovereignty and debt. Germany is taking responsibility for solving Spain's banking problem without having any control over the Spanish banking system. If this becomes the norm in Europe, then Germany has moved from the untenable threat of expelling countries to the untenable promise of underwriting them. Europe, in other words, has accommodated itself to the perpetual crises without solving them.

In our view, the root of the problem is the struggle to align the world's second-largest exporter with a bloc of nations that ought to be enjoying positive trade balances but are instead experiencing trade deficits. Germany, however, views the root of the problem as undisciplined entitlement and social program spending that leads to irresponsible borrowing practices. Thus the Europhiles, led by Germany, don't look for solutions by redefining the European trading system, but rather by disciplining countries, particularly within the eurozone, on their spending and borrowing practices.

According to a report in German magazine Der Spiegel, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi, Eurogroup President Jean-Claude Juncker, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso are drafting a plan to stabilize the system. Under the purported plan, all eurozone members would be required to balance their budgets. Borrowing would be permitted only if approved by a Europe-wide finance minister, a position that would have to be created and supported by a select group of eurozone finance ministers. If approved, money could be borrowed by issuing eurobonds.

The report appears to be well grounded, with European leaders confirming that the four individuals are working on a plan (though they did not confirm the plan's details). The approach outlined in the report would attempt to resolve Europe's problems by increasing the Continent's political integration -- a concept that has been discussed extensively, particularly by the Germans and Europhiles. Given the circumstances, this would seem to be a reasonable position. If all of Europe is going to be responsible for sovereign debt issued by member countries, then the stakeholders who have the most invested in the European project must have control over borrowing. The moral hazard of de facto guarantees on borrowing without such controls is enormous.

There are two problems inherent in this approach. The first, as we have said, is the assumption that Europe's core problem is irresponsible borrowing and that if borrowing were controlled, the European problem would be solved. Irresponsible borrowing is certainly part of the problem, but the deeper issue is trade.

The European Union is built around Germany and therefore the sort of economic dynamism that Germany enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s, when the country benefited from access to the U.S. market while retaining some protection for its own emerging industries. Eurozone countries' inability to cover debt payments stems in part from their inability to compete with Germany. Under normal circumstances, the economies of developing countries grow through exports driven by lower wage rates, but the shared currency prevents developing European countries from taking advantage of low wages. Borrowing may be too high, but Germany's dependence on exports makes it impossible for Berlin to allow a Greece or a Spain the time and space to develop critical economic sectors in the way that the United States allowed Germany to develop after World War II.

The second problem is the more serious one. The ability to manage a national budget, including the right to borrow, is a central element of national sovereignty. If the right to borrow is transferred from national governments to unelected functionaries appointed by a multinational entity, a profound transformation of democracy in Europe will take place. The European Union has seen transfers of sovereign rights from national governments and their electorates before, but none as profound as this one. Elected governments will not be able to stimulate their economies without approval of this as-yet-unnamed board, nor will they be able to undertake long-term capital expenditures based on the issuance of bonds. This board thus will have enormous power within individual countries.

Read more: Spain, Debt and Sovereignty | Stratfor

Stratfor and Brünnhilde

The current Stratfor article by George Friedman discusses the entanglement of Germany and Greece in the current EU financial crisis.

He points out that Greece's debt problem is partly Germany's fault. The German economy rests on exports to the Euro Zone, so German's have had a loose credit policy which has abetted in creating the problem.

Greece has two options, sacrificing its sovereignty as a price for financial aide or defaulting on their debt. Neither choice is a good one, but Greek politics might make default the more palatable option.

The German position is likewise complex, with the reality of their domestic politics as well as the rest of Europe's understandable concern, particularly in light of Germany's performance in the 20th Century, about Germany exerting so much influence in another country's affairs as being worrisome. As a result Germany has a thicket of problems to try to work its way through as well.

It is an interesting article. Below is an excerpt of the start of it, but I recommend you follow the link after the excerpt and read the entire article.

As for the article's Hot Stratfor Babe, of course Brünnhilde was the obvious choice. Not only because she is Teutonic, although that certainly helped her case, but primarily because she is so often associated with the American saying, "it ain't over 'til the fat lady sings."

Although the origin of the saying is unclear, the most common explanation for it is that the fat lady singing refers to the 10 minute aria sung by Brünnhilde that ends the Götterdämmerung cycle of operas by Richard Wagner. There are other explanations, the most convincing being it is an old Southern expression, "Church ain’t out till the fat lady sings." They are chronicled in this Phrase Finder post if you're interested in pursuing the matter further.

Whatever its origin, regarding the EU financial crisis it looks like it is getting closer and closer to the time that the fat lady finally sings. I do not look forward to the radiating shock wave from that aria.


Germany's Role in Europe and the European Debt CrisisBy George Friedman, January 31, 2012

The German government proposed last week that a European commissioner be appointed to supplant the Greek government. While phrasing the German proposal this way might seem extreme, it is not unreasonable. Under the German proposal, this commissioner would hold power over the Greek national budget and taxation. Since the European Central Bank already controls the Greek currency, the euro, this would effectively transfer control of the Greek government to the European Union, since whoever controls a country's government expenditures, tax rates and monetary policy effectively controls that country. The German proposal therefore would suspend Greek sovereignty and the democratic process as the price of financial aid to Greece.

Though the European Commission rejected the proposal, the concept is far from dead, as it flows directly from the logic of the situation. The Greeks are in the midst of a financial crisis that has made Greece unable to repay money Athens borrowed. Their options are to default on the debt or to negotiate a settlement with their creditors. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Union are managing these negotiations.

Any settlement will have three parts. The first is an agreement by creditors to forego repayment on part of the debt. The second is financial help from the IMF and the European Union to help pay back the remaining debt. The third is an agreement by the Greek government to curtail government spending and increase taxes so that it can avoid future sovereign debt crises and repay at least part of the debt.

Bankruptcy and the Nation State

The Germans don't trust the Greeks to keep any bargain, which is not unreasonable given that the Greeks haven't been willing to enforce past agreements. Given this lack of trust, Germany proposed suspending Greek sovereignty by transferring it to a European receiver. This would be a fairly normal process if Greece were a corporation or an individual. In such cases, someone is appointed after bankruptcy or debt restructuring to ensure that a corporation or individual will behave prudently in the future.

A nation state is different. It rests on two assumptions. The first is that the nation represents a uniquely legitimate community whose members share a range of interests and values. The second is that the state arises in some way from the popular will and that only that popular will has the right to determine the state's actions. There is no question that for Europe, the principle of national self-determination is a fundamental moral value. There is no question that Greece is a nation and that its government, according to this principle, is representative of and responsible to the Greek people.

The Germans thus are proposing that Greece, a sovereign country, transfer its right to national self-determination to an overseer. The Germans argue that given the failure of the Greek state, and by extension the Greek public, creditors have the power and moral right to suspend the principle of national self-determination. Given that this argument is being made in Europe, this is a profoundly radical concept. It is important to understand how we got here.

Germany's Part in the Debt Crisis

There were two causes. The first was that Greek democracy, like many democracies, demands benefits for the people from the state, and politicians wishing to be elected must grant these benefits. There is accordingly an inherent pressure on the system to spend excessively. The second cause relates to Germany's status as the world's second-largest exporter. About 40 percent of German gross domestic product comes from exports, much of them to the European Union. For all their discussion of fiscal prudence and care, the Germans have an interest in facilitating consumption and demand for their exports across Europe. Without these exports, Germany would plunge into depression.

Therefore, the Germans have used the institutions and practices of the European Union to maintain demand for their products. Through the currency union, Germany has enabled other eurozone states to access credit at rates their economies didn't merit in their own right. In this sense, Germany encouraged demand for its exports by facilitating irresponsible lending practices across Europe. The degree to which German actions encouraged such imprudent practices -- since German industrial production vastly outstrips its domestic market, making sustained consumption in markets outside Germany critical to German economic prosperity -- is not fully realized.

Read the rest of Germany's Role in Europe and the European Debt Crisis