However, I will say that one of the reasons I like Friedman is that he tends to bake a lot of inertia, from both geopolitical and institutional sources, into his analysis. I think that is a pretty good rule of thumb. Following international affairs too closely can cause one to whipsaw as crisis follows crisis, but at the end of the day it is always well to remember just how consistent a nation's interest tends to be historically.
The article's Hot Stratfor Babe choice puzzled me for a bit, but then Obama's effete and ineffectual Ivy League wankerosity brought to mind Jane Hathaway of the Beverly Hillbillies. Once that seed was planted Nancy Kulp became the easy choice for the article's Hot Stratfor Babe honors.
Jane Hathaway, a Vassar graduate, parlayed her education into the position as the under-payed and much put upon secretary of the Banker Milburn Drysdale. When not being bullied by Drysdale she spent most of the series sputtering in confusion over the goings on around her and with an unrequited crush on the bumpkin Jethro Bodine.
Nancy Kulp, who was intelligent and well educated, actually went to Hollywood to be a publicist for the studios. However, within 3 weeks of arriving she found herself in front of the camera, beginning a long career as a character actress. Interestingly, later in life she dabbled in politics by running for a U.S. House of Representative seat as a Democrat in Pennsylvania. She had a falling out with Buddy Ebsen (who played Jed Clampett) who recorded ads for her opponent saying she was too liberal.
As a bonus, after the article I've embedded a video of Dash Riprock mistaking Jane Hathaway for Elle Mae who Drysdale is making him woo. Instead, Dash ends up putting the moves on Jane by accident.
OBAMA'S DILEMMA: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ELECTORAL REALITIES
By George Friedman, September 20, 2011
STRATFOR does not normally involve itself in domestic American politics. Our focus is on international affairs, and American politics, like politics everywhere, is a passionate business. The vilification from all sides that follows any mention we make of American politics is both inevitable and unpleasant. Nevertheless, it's our job to chronicle the unfolding of the international system, and the fact that the United States is moving deeply into an election cycle will affect American international behavior and therefore the international system.
The United States remains the center of gravity of the international system. The sheer size of its economy (regardless of its growth rate) and the power of its military (regardless of its current problems) make the United States unique. Even more important, no single leader of the world is as significant, for good or bad, as the American president. That makes the American presidency, in its broadest sense, a matter that cannot be ignored in studying the international system.
The American system was designed to be a phased process. By separating the selection of the legislature from the selection of the president, the founders created a system that did not allow for sudden shifts in personnel. Unlike parliamentary systems, in which the legislature and the leadership are intimately linked, the institutional and temporal uncoupling of the system in the United States was intended to control the passing passions by leaving about two-thirds of the U.S. Senate unchanged even in a presidential election year, which always coincides with the election of the House of Representatives. Coupled with senatorial rules, this makes it difficult for the president to govern on domestic affairs. Changes in the ideological tenor of the system are years in coming, and when they come they stay a long time. Mostly, however, the system is in gridlock. Thomas Jefferson said that a government that governs least is the best. The United States has a vast government that rests on a system in which significant change is not impossible but which demands a level of consensus over a period of time that rarely exists.
This is particularly true in domestic politics, where the complexity is compounded by the uncertainty of the legislative branch. Consider that the healthcare legislation passed through major compromise is still in doubt, pending court rulings that thus far have been contradictory. All of this would have delighted the founders if not the constantly trapped presidents, who frequently shrug off their limits in the domestic arena in favor of action in the international realm, where their freedom to maneuver is much greater, as the founders intended.
The Burden of the Past
The point of this is that all U.S. presidents live within the framework in which Barack Obama is now operating. First, no president begins with a clean slate. All begin with the unfinished work of the prior administration. Thus, George W. Bush began his presidency with an al Qaeda whose planning and implementation for 9/11 was already well under way. Some of the al Qaeda operatives who would die in the attack were already in the country. So, like all of his predecessors, Obama assumed the presidency with his agenda already laid out.
Obama had a unique set of problems. The first was his agenda, which focused on ending the Iraq war and reversing social policies in place since Ronald Reagan became president in 1981. By the time Obama entered office, the process of withdrawal from Iraq was under way, which gave him the option of shifting the terminal date. The historic reversal that he wanted to execute, starting with healthcare reform, confronted the realities of September 2008 and the American financial crisis. His Iraq policy was in place by Inauguration Day while his social programs were colliding with the financial crisis.
Obama's campaign was about more than particular policies. He ran on a platform that famously promised change and hope. His tremendous political achievement was in framing those concepts in such a way that they were interpreted by voters to mean precisely what they wanted them to mean without committing Obama to specific policies. To the anti-war faction it meant that the wars would end. To those concerned about unilateralism it meant that unilateralism would be replaced by multilateralism. To those worried about growing inequality it meant that he would end inequality. To those concerned about industrial jobs going overseas it meant that those jobs would stay in the United States. To those who hated Guantanamo it meant that Guantanamo would be closed.
Obama created a coalition whose expectations of what Obama would do were shaped by them and projected on Obama. In fact, Obama never quite said what his supporters thought he said. His supporters thought they heard that he was anti-war. He never said that. He simply said that he opposed Iraq and thought Afghanistan should be waged. His strategy was to allow his followers to believe what they wanted so long as they voted for him, and they obliged. Now, this is not unique to Obama. It is how presidents get elected. What was unique was how well he did it and the problems it caused once he became president. [continued after the jump]
