This week's Stratfor article concerns the strategic quandary that would face Israel should the uprising in Egypt lead to the cancellation of the Camp David accords.
The Hot Babe I decided to connect to this article is the Sports Illustrated cover girl and Israeli model Bar Refaeli.
Not for the obvious reason of the dangers that the Muslim Brotherhood would pose towards swim suit models, although that is a most alarming thought, but rather because of a controversy in Bar Refaeli's past.
Apparently Bar Refaeli, who is an Israeli swimsuit model, dodged the Israeli draft by marrying a relative to avoid being called up, and then quickly divorcing him when that possibility passed. This caused a bit of an uproar in Israel, with calls for boycotts and criticism from other models who were serving their time in the military.
You can read about it, and gawk a picture of her in a rather fetching gray dress, in The Independent's article: Israeli supermodels in catwalk spat over draft-dodging.
EGYPT, ISRAEL AND A STRATEGIC RECONSIDERATION
By George Friedman, February 8, 2011
The events in Egypt have sent shock waves through Israel. The 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel have been the bedrock of Israeli national security. In three of the four wars Israel fought before the accords, a catastrophic outcome for Israel was conceivable. In 1948, 1967 and 1973, credible scenarios existed in which the Israelis were defeated and the state of Israel ceased to exist. In 1973, it appeared for several days that one of those scenarios was unfolding.
The survival of Israel was no longer at stake after 1978. In the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the various Palestinian intifadas and the wars with Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza in 2008, Israeli interests were involved, but not survival. There is a huge difference between the two. Israel had achieved a geopolitical ideal after 1978 in which it had divided and effectively made peace with two of the four Arab states that bordered it, and neutralized one of those states. The treaty with Egypt removed the threat to the Negev and the southern coastal approaches to Tel Aviv.
The agreement with Jordan in 1994, which formalized a long-standing relationship, secured the longest and most vulnerable border along the Jordan River. The situation in Lebanon was such that whatever threat emerged from there was limited. Only Syria remained hostile but, by itself, it could not threaten Israel. Damascus was far more focused on Lebanon anyway. As for the Palestinians, they posed a problem for Israel, but without the foreign military forces along the frontiers, the Palestinians could trouble but not destroy Israel. Israel's existence was not at stake, nor was it an issue for 33 years.
The Historic Egyptian Threat to Israel
The center of gravity of Israel's strategic challenge was always Egypt. The largest Arab country, with about 80 million people, Egypt could field the most substantial army. More to the point, Egypt could absorb casualties at a far higher rate than Israel. The danger that the Egyptian army posed was that it could close with the Israelis and engage in extended, high-intensity combat that would break the back of the Israel Defense Forces by imposing a rate of attrition that Israel could not sustain. If Israel were to be simultaneously engaged with Syria, dividing its forces and its logistical capabilities, it could run out of troops long before Egypt, even if Egypt were absorbing far more casualties.
The solution for the Israelis was to initiate combat at a time and place of their own choosing, preferably with surprise, as they did in 1956 and 1967. Failing that, as they did in 1973, the Israelis would be forced into a holding action they could not sustain and forced onto an offensive in which the risks of failure -- and the possibility -- would be substantial.
