Showing posts with label Moleman Gka'addaphee aka Moammar Gadhafi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Moleman Gka'addaphee aka Moammar Gadhafi. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 22, 2011
Stratfor and Anne Heywood
The latest Stratfor article concerns the situation in Libya. I think it places too much emphasis on the West expecting Democratic reform in North Africa as a result of their protests and revolutions. I'm sure there is some hope for that, but I suspect much of the West's maneuvering is far more cynical.
I think that Italy and the rest of the southern belly of Europe were horrified at the thought of refugees streaming north and, perhaps most importantly in terms of the drive towards military intervention, France got ahead of events by recognizing the rebel Libyan National Council as the country's legitimate government. When it all started to go pear-shaped after Moleman Gka'addaphee (<= official Flares spelling of his name) successfully pushed east to crush the rebellion I think the French, to try to save the situation, pretty much bamboozled Hillary into committing American military assets. The democracy stuff is just window dressing.
At any rate, for this articles Hot Strafor Babe I looked to ancient Carthage for inspiration, found the movie Carthage in Flames, and out popped Anne Heywood. The movie is an Italian spectacle about the fall and sacking of Carthage by the Romans and presumably has a cast of thousands. It also has a corny soap opera love triangle tacked on which drives the story. One reviewer at the IMDb described it as something that "seemed to have been plotted by a monkey on espresso". Oddly enough, that comment makes me want to see the film all the more for some reason.
LIBYA, THE WEST AND THE NARRATIVE OF DEMOCRACY
By George Friedman, March 22, 2011
Forces from the United States and some European countries have intervened in Libya. Under U.N. authorization, they have imposed a no-fly zone in Libya, meaning they will shoot down any Libyan aircraft that attempts to fly within Libya. In addition, they have conducted attacks against aircraft on the ground, airfields, air defenses and the command, control and communication systems of the Libyan government, and French and U.S. aircraft have struck against Libyan armor and ground forces. There also are reports of European and Egyptian special operations forces deploying in eastern Libya, where the opposition to the government is centered, particularly around the city of Benghazi. In effect, the intervention of this alliance has been against the government of Moammar Gadhafi, and by extension, in favor of his opponents in the east.
The alliance's full intention is not clear, nor is it clear that the allies are of one mind. The U.N. Security Council resolution clearly authorizes the imposition of a no-fly zone. By extension, this logically authorizes strikes against airfields and related targets. Very broadly, it also defines the mission of the intervention as protecting civilian lives. As such, it does not specifically prohibit the presence of ground forces, though it does clearly state that no "foreign occupation force" shall be permitted on Libyan soil. It can be assumed they intended that forces could intervene in Libya but could not remain in Libya after the intervention. What this means in practice is less than clear.
There is no question that the intervention is designed to protect Gadhafi's enemies from his forces. Gadhafi had threatened to attack "without mercy" and had mounted a sustained eastward assault that the rebels proved incapable of slowing. Before the intervention, the vanguard of his forces was on the doorstep of Benghazi. The protection of the eastern rebels from Gadhafi's vengeance coupled with attacks on facilities under Gadhafi's control logically leads to the conclusion that the alliance wants regime change, that it wants to replace the Gadhafi government with one led by the rebels.
But that would be too much like the invasion of Iraq against Saddam Hussein, and the United Nations and the alliance haven't gone that far in their rhetoric, regardless of the logic of their actions. Rather, the goal of the intervention is explicitly to stop Gadhafi's threat to slaughter his enemies, support his enemies but leave the responsibility for the outcome in the hands of the eastern coalition. In other words -- and this requires a lot of words to explain -- they want to intervene to protect Gadhafi's enemies, they are prepared to support those enemies (though it is not clear how far they are willing to go in providing that support), but they will not be responsible for the outcome of the civil war.
The Regional Context
To understand this logic, it is essential to begin by considering recent events in North Africa and the Arab world and the manner in which Western governments interpreted them. Beginning with Tunisia, spreading to Egypt and then to the Arabian Peninsula, the last two months have seen widespread unrest in the Arab world. Three assumptions have been made about this unrest. The first was that it represented broad-based popular opposition to existing governments, rather than representing the discontent of fragmented minorities -- in other words, that they were popular revolutions. Second, it assumed that these revolutions had as a common goal the creation of a democratic society. Third, it assumed that the kind of democratic society they wanted was similar to European-American democracy, in other words, a constitutional system supporting Western democratic values.
Each of the countries experiencing unrest was very different. For example, in Egypt, while the cameras focused on demonstrators, they spent little time filming the vast majority of the country that did not rise up. Unlike 1979 in Iran, the shopkeepers and workers did not protest en masse. Whether they supported the demonstrators in Tahrir Square is a matter of conjecture. They might have, but the demonstrators were a tiny fraction of Egyptian society, and while they clearly wanted a democracy, it is less than clear that they wanted a liberal democracy. Recall that the Iranian Revolution created an Islamic Republic more democratic than its critics would like to admit, but radically illiberal and oppressive. In Egypt, it is clear that Mubarak was generally loathed but not clear that the regime in general was being rejected. It is not clear from the outcome what will happen now. Egypt may stay as it is, it may become an illiberal democracy or it may become a liberal democracy. [continued after the jump]
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