Stratfor and Arija Bareikis

In the latest Stratfor article Scott Stewart discusses, in light of the withdrawal of US combat forces in Iraq, security considerations for the American embassy in Baghdad.

He begins by discussing the concentric physical steps taken to secure an embassy, starting from the outer walls and moving in to the safe rooms in the interior of the compound.

There are also concentric levels of forces to guard an embassy. At the outer level the host government in supposed to provide security while the embassy hires a large number of security contractors to provide security to the embassy's grounds as well as detachments to guard personnel traveling outside of the embassy. 

There is also a contingent of Marines to provide security to the embassy's most secure areas. Stewart ends his discussion by looking at the forces staged out-of-country, but who might be called upon to support the embassy if it were to come under attack and some of the challenges such a mission would present.

For the article's Hot Stratfor Babe I turned to the short-lived American TV series The American Embassy and selected its lead Arija Bareikis for the honor.

The American Embassy looks like it was originally planned to be a show about the romantic and whacky adventures of a young, independent woman in an exotic setting -- in this case the U.S. embassy in London. However, 9/11 forced it to be reworked to take into account terrorism, and so the show mixed in an embassy bombing along with her romantic adventures. Regardless, the show was a flop, getting canceled after its third episode and only airing 4 of the 6 episodes that got made.

As for Ms Bareikis, I confess to knowing nothing about her. Looking at her film and TV credits, it appears that she is an actress who works on a regular basis. Her female lead status the series The American Embassy promised was derailed for a while, but she has since 2009 worked regularly as a main character in the TV show Southland. 

Sorry, no bonus video clip this article. I couldn't find a decent one.


U.S. Diplomatic Security in Iraq After the Withdrawal
By Scott Stewart, December 22,2011

The completion of the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq on Dec. 16 opens a new chapter in the relationship between the United States and Iraq. One of this chapter’s key features will be the efforts of the United States and its regional allies to limit Iranian influence inside Iraq during the post-Saddam, post-U.S. occupation era.

From the 1970s until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iranian power in the Persian Gulf was balanced by Iraq’s powerful military. With Iraqi military might weakened in 1991 and shattered in 2003, the responsibility for countering Iranian power fell to the U.S. military. With that military now gone from Iraq, the task of countering Iranian power falls to diplomatic, foreign-aid and intelligence functions conducted by a host of U.S. agencies stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and consulates in Basra, Kirkuk and Arbil.

Following the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad became the largest embassy in the world. Ensuring the safety of as many as 11,000 people working out of the embassy and consulates in such a potentially hostile environment will pose a huge challenge to the U.S. State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), the agency with primary responsibility for keeping diplomatic facilities and personnel secure. The CIA’s Office of Security (OS) will also play a substantial, though less obvious, role in keeping CIA case officers safe as they conduct their duties.

Both the DSS and the OS are familiar with operating in hostile environments. They have done so for decades in places such as Beirut and, for the better part of a decade now, in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. However, they have never before had to protect such a large number of people in such a hostile environment without direct U.S. military assistance. The sheer scope of the security programs in Iraq will bring about not only operational challenges but also budgetary battles that may prove as deadly to U.S. personnel in Iraq as the militant threat.

Scope

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad sits on a 104-acre compound in Baghdad’s Green Zone. The size of the compound provides significant standoff distance from the perimeter to the interior buildings. The chancery itself, like the consulate buildings, was constructed in accordance with security specifications laid out by the U.S. State Department’s Standard Embassy Design program, standards first established by the Inman Commission in 1985 in the wake of the U.S. Embassy bombings in Beirut. This means that the building was constructed using a design intended to withstand a terrorist attack and to provide concentric rings of security. In addition to an advanced concrete structure and blast-resistant windows, such facilities also feature a substantial perimeter wall intended to protect the facility and to provide a standoff distance of at least 100 feet from any potential explosive device.

(click here to enlarge image)

Standoff distance is a crucial factor in defending against large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) because such devices can cause catastrophic damage to even well-designed structures if they are allowed to get close before detonation. When combined, a heavy perimeter wall, sufficient standoff distance and advanced structural design have proved successful in withstanding even large VBIED attacks.

Working inside the heavily fortified embassy and consulates in Iraq are some 16,000 personnel, 5,000 of whom are security contractors. The remaining 11,000 include diplomats, intelligence officers and analysts, defense attaches, military liaison personnel and aid and development personnel. There also are many contractors who perform support functions such as maintaining the facilities and vehicles and providing needed services such as cooking and cleaning.

When considering the 5,000 security contractors, it is important to remember that there are two different classes of contractors who work under separate contracts (there are contracts for perimeter guards and personal security details in Baghdad as well as for security personnel at the consulates in Basra, Erbil and Kirkuk). The vast majority of security contractors are third-country nationals who are responsible for providing perimeter security for the embassy and consulates. The second, smaller group of contract security guards (from 500 to 700, many of whom are Americans) is responsible for providing personal security to diplomats, aid workers and other embassy or consulate personnel when they leave the compound. A parallel team of OS contract security officers, funded under the CIA’s budget, provides security for CIA officers when they leave the compound. [continued after the jump]

Stratfor and Elsa Lanchester

This Stratfor contrasts Libya, Iraq and Syria with regards to Western vs Iranian diplomatic and military moves in the region.

Friedman points out that in Libya the Gadhafi's defeat was accomplished by a fractious group of rebels who had the backing on considerable military support from NATO. 

With Gadhafi now gone a stable government is still not likely, rather the various rebel factions, and any remnants of Gadhafi's old power base, are likely to slip into a bloody civil war that will still require NATO intervention at some level.

In some ways this is similar to Iraq, where a tenuous coalition government was unable to negotiate terms of a continued American presence, which led to Obama having to try to claim his withdrawal plans were an American initiative rather than a breakdown in talks to allow a US troops to continue to be based in the country.

Freidman then contrasts those two efforts with Syria, another country in the region in turmoil, but this one with Iran providing the external military intervention. Of course, if Assad survives then Iranian power will expand in the region just as the American presence recedes. 

This whole business reminded me of the creation of Frankenstein's monster -- it probably seemed like a good idea at the time but it turned out to be botched. Of course that led to Elsa Lanchester, the Bride of  Frankenstein, as the natural selection for the article's Hot Stratfor Babe.

Ms Lanchester, who was Charles Laughton's wife, is best remembered as the big lug's bride, started out as a dancer. However, she began to act in the silent era and had an extremely long career in movies and on TV, with her last movie role in 1980.

As the bonus, after the article I've included the scene where Frankenstein meets his new sweetie. Sadly, the courtship doesn't exactly go according to plan.


LIBYA AND IRAQ: THE PRICE OF SUCCESS
By George Friedman, October 25, 2011

In a week when the European crisis continued building, the White House chose publicly to focus on announcements about the end of wars. The death of Moammar Gadhafi was said to mark the end of the war in Libya, and excitement about a new democratic Libya abounded. Regarding Iraq, the White House transformed the refusal of the Iraqi government to permit U.S. troops to remain into a decision by Washington instead of an Iraqi rebuff.

Though in both cases there was an identical sense of “mission accomplished,” the matter was not nearly as clear-cut. The withdrawal from Iraq creates enormous strategic complexities rather than closure. While the complexities in Libya are real but hardly strategic, the two events share certain characteristics and are instructive.

Libya After Gadhafi

Let us begin with the lesser event, Gadhafi’s death. After seven months of NATO intervention, Gadhafi was killed. That it took so long for this to happen stands out, given that the intervention involved far more than airstrikes, including special operations forces on the ground targeting for airstrikes, training Libyan troops, managing logistics, overseeing communications and both planning and at times organizing and leading the Libyan insurgents in battle.

Perhaps this length of time resulted from a strategy designed to minimize casualties at the cost of prolonging the war. Alternatively, that it took seven months to achieve this goal might reflect the extent of the insurgents’ division, poor training and incompetence. Whatever the reason, the more important question is what NATO thinks it has accomplished with Gadhafi’s death, as satisfying as that death might be.

The National Transitional Council (NTC), the umbrella organization crafted to contain the insurgents, is in no position to govern Libya by any ideology, let alone through constitutional democracy. Gadhafi and his supporters ruled Libya for 42 years; the only people in the NTC with any experience with government gained that experience as ministers or lesser officials in Gadhafi’s government. Some may have switched sides out of principle, but I suspect that most defected to save themselves. While the media has portrayed many of these ex-ministers as opponents of Gadhafi, anyone who served him was complicit in his crimes.

These individuals are the least likely to bring reform to Libya and the most likely to constitute the core of a new state, as they are the only Libyans who know what it means to govern. Around them is an array of tribes living in varying degrees of tension and hostility with each other and radical Islamists whose number and capabilities are unknown, but whose access to weapons can be assumed. It also is safe to assume that many of those weapons, of various types of lethality, will be on the black market in the region in short order, as they may already be.

Gadhafi did not rule for 42 years without substantial support, as the tenacity of those who fought on his behalf suggests. (The defense of Sirte could well be described as fanatical.) Gadhafi is dead, but not all of his supporters are. And there are other elements within the country who may not be Gadhafi supporters but are no less interested in resisting those who are now trying to take charge — and resisting anyone perceived to be backed by Western powers. As with the conquest of Baghdad in 2003, what was unanticipated — but should not have been — was that a variety of groups would resist the new leaders and wage guerrilla war.

Baghdad taught that overwhelming force must be brought to bear in any invasion such that all opposition is eliminated. Otherwise, opponents of foreign occupation — along with native elements with a grudge against other natives — are quite capable of creating chaos. When we look at the list of NTC members and try to imagine them cooperating with each other and when we consider the number of Gadhafi supporters who are now desperadoes with little to lose, the path to stable constitutional democracy runs either through NATO occupation (unofficial, of course) or through a period of intense chaos. The most likely course ahead is a NATO presence sufficient to enrage the Libyan people but insufficient to intimidate them.

And Libya is not a strategic country. It is neither large in population nor geographically pivotal. It does have oil, as everyone likes to point out, and that makes it appealing. But it is not clear that the presence of oil increases the tendency toward stability. When we look back on Iraq, an oil-rich country, oil simply became another contentious issue in a galaxy of contentious issues.

The Lesson of Baghdad

Regarding Libya, I have a sense of Baghdad in April 2003. U.S. President Barack Obama’s announcement of a complete U.S. withdrawal from Iraq gives us a sense of what lies at the end of the tunnel of the counterinsurgency. It must be understood that Obama did not want a total withdrawal. Until just a few weeks before the announcement, he was looking for ways to keep some troops in Iraq’s Kurdish region. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta went to Iraq wanting an agreement providing for a substantial number of U.S. troops in Iraq past the Dec. 31 deadline for withdrawal.

While the idea did appeal to some in Iraq, it ultimately failed. This is because the decision-making structure of the Iraqi government that emerged from U.S. occupation and the war is so fragmented it has failed even to craft a law on hydrocarbons, something critical to the future of Iraq. It was therefore in no position to reach consensus, or even a simple majority, over the question of a continued presence of foreign troops. Many Iraqis did want a U.S. presence, particularly those concerned about their fate once the United States leaves, such as the Kurds and Sunnis. The most important point is not that the Iraqis decided they did not want troops; it is that the Iraqi government was in the end too incoherent to reach any decision. [continued after the jump]

Stratfor and Julanne Johnston

In this Strafor article George Friedman discusses the evolving situation between Iran and Saudi Arabia in light of the looming withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. 

The U.S. is working to modify the Status of Forces Agreement between Washington and Iraq to allow troops to remain, but even if they could get an agreement to leave a small trip-wire force in place, there would still exist a power vacumm in the Gulf area. Naturally, Iran seeks to fill that vacuum if possible.


For this article's Hot Stratfor Babe I selected Julanne Johnston, who starred with Douglass Fairbanks in the 1924 film The Thief of Bagdad.

I don't know much about the movie, but in preparing these comments I watched bits and pieces of the film. The sets, large cast of extras and the special effects are pretty impressive for their day. Although I'm not much of a silent film fan, I would like to see a good print of this movie someday. 

As a bonus, at the end of the article I've included a brief video of Fairbanks and Johnston whizzing out of the palace, flying above the cheering throngs and over the city walls as they sail off into the finale. It gives some feel for the scale of the sets and level of the special effects of the film.


IRAQ, IRAN AND THE NEXT MOVE
By George Friedman, April 26, 2011

The United States told the Iraqi government last week that if it wants U.S. troops to remain in Iraq beyond the deadline of Dec. 31, 2011, as stipulated by the current Status of Forces Agreement between Washington and Baghdad, it would have to inform the United States quickly. Unless a new agreement is reached soon, the United States will be unable to remain. The implication in the U.S. position is that a complex planning process must be initiated to leave troops there and delays will not allow that process to take place.

What is actually going on is that the United States is urging the Iraqi government to change its mind on U.S. withdrawal, and it would like Iraq to change its mind right now in order to influence some of the events taking place in the Persian Gulf. The Shiite uprising in Bahrain and the Saudi intervention, along with events in Yemen, have created an extremely unstable situation in the region, and the United States is afraid that completing the withdrawal would increase the instability.

The Iranian Rise

The American concern, of course, has to do with Iran. The United States has been unable to block Iranian influence in Iraq's post-Baathist government. Indeed, the degree to which the Iraqi government is a coherent entity is questionable, and its military and security forces have limited logistical and planning ability and are not capable of territorial defense. The issue is not the intent of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who himself is enigmatic. The problem is that the coalition that governs Iraq is fragmented and still not yet finalized, dominated by Iranian proxies such Muqtada al-Sadr -- and it only intermittently controls the operations of the ministries under it, or the military and security forces.

As such, Iraq is vulnerable to the influence of any substantial power, and the most important substantial power following the withdrawal of the United States will be Iran. There has been much discussion of the historic tension between Iraqi Shia and Iranian Shia, all of which is true. But Iran has been systematically building its influence in Iraq among all factions using money, blackmail and ideology delivered by a sophisticated intelligence service. More important, as the United States withdraws, Iraqis, regardless of their feelings toward Iran (those Iraqis who haven't always felt this way), are clearly sensing that resisting Iran is dangerous and accommodation with Iran is the only solution. They see Iran as the rising power in the region, and that perception is neither unreasonable nor something to which the United States or Saudi Arabia has an easy counter.

The Iraqi government's response to the American offer has been predictable. While some quietly want the United States to remain, the general response has ranged from dismissal to threats if the United States did not leave. Given that the United States has reportedly offered to leave as many as 20,000 troops in a country that 170,000 American troops could not impose order on, the Iraqi perception is that this is merely a symbolic presence and that endorsing it would get Iraq into trouble with Iran, which has far more than 20,000 troops and ever-present intelligence services. It is not clear that the Iraqis were ever prepared to allow U.S. troops to remain, but 20,000 is enough to enrage Iran and not enough to deal with the consequences.

The American assumption in deciding to leave Iraq -- and this goes back to George W. Bush as well as Barack Obama -- was that over the course of four years, the United States would be able to leave because it would have created a coherent government and military. The United States underestimated the degree to which fragmentation in Iraq would prevent that outcome and the degree to which Iranian influence would undermine the effort. The United States made a pledge to the American public and a treaty with the Iraqi government to withdraw forces, but the conditions that were expected to develop simply did not.

Not coincidentally, the withdrawal of American forces has coincided with tremendous instability in the region, particularly on the Arabian Peninsula. All around the periphery of Saudi Arabia an arc of instability has emerged. It is not that the Iranians engineered it, but they have certainly taken advantage of it. As a result, Saudi Arabia is in a position where it has had to commit forces in Bahrain, is standing by in Yemen, and is even concerned about internal instability given the rise of both reform-minded and Shiite elements at a time of unprecedented transition given the geriatric state of the country's top four leaders. Iran has certainly done whatever it could to exacerbate this instability, which fits neatly into the Iraqi situation.

As the United States leaves Iraq, Iran expects to increase its influence there. Iran normally acts cautiously even while engaged in extreme rhetoric. Therefore, it is unlikely to send conventional forces into Iraq. Indeed, it might not be necessary to do so in order to gain a dominant political position. Nor is it inconceivable that the Iranians could decide to act more aggressively. With the United States gone, the risks decline.

Saudi Arabia's Problem

The country that could possibly counter Iran in Iraq is Saudi Arabia, which has been known to funnel money to Sunni groups there. Its military is no match for Iran's in a battle for Iraq, and its influence there has been less than Iran's among most groups. More important, as the Saudis face the crisis on their periphery they are diverted and preoccupied by events to the east and south. The unrest in the region, therefore, increases the sense of isolation of some Iraqis and increases their vulnerability to Iran. Thus, given that Iraq is Iran's primary national security concern, the events in the Persian Gulf work to Iran's advantage. [continued after jump]

Friday Links

Download the latest version of World Wide Telescope—totally awesome.

The US must update its nuclear deterrent.

Attractive fathers do not attractive sons make.

The court limits business method patents.

What kids are up to these days.

The candidate of decline.

Introducing Hushie.

The paradox of an unattractive Russia.

Is malaria winning the race?

Contrary to propaganda, McCain is not more of the same.

Why not just let them marry?

More scary—but hidden—Obama connections.

The persecution of Christians continues in Iraq.

The persecution of Christians continues in India.

Is the Iceman from a different branch of humanity?

Is the Newest Deal bad for the market?

Wednesday Links

Wall Street is kaput.

Mickey Mouse must die.

Enough with the economic pessimism nonsense.

A breast cancer vaccine that works?

Business based solely on ramping up risk and leverage doesn't work.

Twilight of the GPU.

Diving deep into the Obama tank.

Search outside the law of the land.

Who runs Russia?

An object unlike any ever seen before.

Sharia courts are operating in Britain.

The first new family of ants since 1923.

How Petraeus did it.

Embracing English after all.

Not clear on the facts.

Do the hinterlanders reject "liberalism" or are they deeply racist?

She's not really top, top drawer, is she?

Thursday Links

Is the war over?

Struck by lightning, she lives to tell the tale (and show you the video).

Is mocking now a thing of the past?

When you want those moquitoes to bite you.

The illegal immigrant criminal network exposed.

Chariot racing redux?

Why the race is tied.

Dark Knight raises the bar.

A baffling economy.

Burgers in Paris.

Is the US broke?

The saga continues: AOL + Microsoft? Is MapQuest the new Maps.Live?

Sex with her brother?

The latest in sweeteners.

Can you crack the mysterious missive?

Sunday Links

We're not leaving.

China and Russia protect Mugabe.

How the brain changes coordinates.

Phil Gramm is right.

Autism and the miswired brain.

The $5 trillion mess.

Half a million years of chat.

The ruthlessly imposed illusion of calm in Tibet.

The best movie endings ever.

Radical Islam is not compatible with French values.

Artificial photosynthesis through nanotubes?

China is fueling war in Darfur.

The great biofuels con.

Friday Links

The rising flood of militant Islam in Pakistan.

Could the long tail theory be wrong after all?

The state of the woman-as-victim narrative, 2008.

The first images of the Solar System's invisible frontier.

The three great American ideas.

Herpes uses microRNA to hide.

Optimism is growing in Iraq.

The flat atom and its uses.

10 summer projects.

Skinheads in Russia.

Still ignoring the coming entitlement tsunami.

Saturday Links

(Photo H/T: The Daily Telegraph)

He does what politicians do.

Where the ozone goes.

How the other half lives.

The top 10 TED talks.

The latest Google perk.

Volcanoes to the rescue.

When love doesn't conquer all.

Hummingbirds a specialized form of nighthawks?

Christians must pay.

Watch out, bears.

Introducing Jogli.

The swimsuit of the future is now.

Tuesday Links

An hour to cross the Atlantic?

Diary of a failed startup.

In the pocket of Big Ethanol.

More mysteries of the Maya uncovered.

It's not easy to not drive.

When nature fights back.

When obnoxious arrogance is the right stuff.

Saturday Links

Who's side are we on again?

Phew! A changing physical constant of the universe is constant after all.

The virtue of hypocrisy.

The most effective politician seen in decades.

Permafrost in them thar hills.

More rats executives leaving the ship.

The passion behind the veil.

No girls need apply here either.

Yahoo the failure?

Women and men found to be different after all.

Wednesday Links

Close to winning in Afghanistan.

Spy vs. Spy—the Internet version.

A tale of two tattles.

The strangest looking mammals.

What dictionaries tell us about our brains.

Wir lieben Obama!

The 1-room schoolhouse for the 21st century.

Logarithms are us.

Why Al Qaida is failing.

Cutting the corporate tax because it's the right thing to do.

Blowing up the Danes.

The dangers of old dad.

Billboards that watch you.

Christian martyrs in China.

No jokes please, we're Russian.

Counting Paragraphs?

It appears that Doug Feith believes he can quantify the "shift" in Bush's rhetoric by counting paragraphs in speeches.

This change can be quantified: In the year beginning with his first major speech about Iraq – the Sept. 12, 2002 address to the U.N. General Assembly – Mr. Bush delivered nine major talks about Iraq. There were, on average, approximately 14 paragraphs per speech on Saddam's record as an enemy, aggressor, tyrant and danger, with only three paragraphs on promoting democracy. In the next year – from September 2003 to September 2004 – Mr. Bush delivered 15 major talks about Iraq. The average number of paragraphs devoted to the record of threats from Saddam was one, and the number devoted to democracy promotion was approximately 11.

Unfortunately, he appears to have forgotten to read the NY Times editorial page. It is understandable considering the treatment he has gotten and how his words have been twisted at times. One would think he would know better than to get into that game. From the NY Times of February 27, 2003:

President Bush sketched an expansive vision last night of what he expects to accomplish by a war in Iraq. Instead of focusing on eliminating weapons of mass destruction, or reducing the threat of terror to the United States, Mr. Bush talked about establishing a ''free and peaceful Iraq'' that would serve as a ''dramatic and inspiring example'' to the entire Arab and Muslim world, provide a stabilizing influence in the Middle East and even help end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

More to the point Feith acts as if the situation in Iraq is something relatively static, like a mountain, rather than something dynamic and changing. Bush has not communicated well, but Feith, of all people, ought to know what bad press is. Maybe Feith didn't communicate well or everyone would understand his position instead of the caricature he is made out to be. Isn't he writing a book to set the record straight?

Sunday Links

The war we are in is the war we must win.

Logic puzzles.

Protecting the right to remove your right to breathe.

How to read a business book.

Requiring and demanding.

Could global warming be good for New Orleans?

A helping hand for Ahmadinejad.

From the stomachs of gators.

The coming Senate massacre.

The 25 best websites for travel.

Wednesday Links

Goodbye space-time continuum, hello gabby black holes.

Microsoft is really desperate.

The happiest people on Earth?

Free music online.

Creatures of new habit.

How to solve your physician shortage.

Robots removing brain tumors.

Friedman day gets a little later.

Tracking you in the shopping center.

The world's most powerful laser.

It's all the fat people's fault.

Enjoy your job.

China's panopticon.

Turning off the brain's ability to speak with a magnet.

The real Iraq.

Friday Links

Recent glaciers on Mars?

The sky's not actually falling yet.

First look at Live Mesh.

Maliki succeeds.

Is the Big Shopping Spree over?

Removing the Storm Botnet, one PC at a time.

The new magician.

Al Qaida angry at Iranian lies.

The sky almost fell—70,000 years ago.

Economy and Empire.

Astrology debunked.

Nuclear Syria.

Friday Links

The inside story of the Surge.

Her list of lies.

The end of Tibet.

The campus rape myth.

Programming in R, the basics.

Sex in Japan.

Flying police robots in Miami.

Fitna the movie.

The end of capitalism?

Email of the future.

Fixing poverty in America.

50 movies guys should see before they die.

How to control the Internet.

Weekly Links

As big a shock as Sputnik? So much for superpower status....

Is the new Zune better than the iPod Classic?

Fast food nutrition.

How to get 99% of the hydrogen from waste.

Google claims to have produced a quantum computer—but is it a hoax?

The 10 weirdest houses.

Is 10 years old too young for the 39 raisins?

Introducing Songza.

Squeezing 40% more transistors in.

The difficult patients of the information age.

The source of empathy and autism?

Krugman's latest innocent mistakes.

Even more poor people are with us in South Africa.

More Python goodies.

The source of all chocolate.

How to invest in Africa.

Sunday Links

Pui Mun
Originally uploaded by duke9042004

Facebook is stalking you.

Fly me over the Moon, in HDTV.

30-year vaporware.

William Gibson speaks.

7 engineering wonders of the modern world.

French nuclear bombs, circa 1968.

The big juicy Twitter guide.

201 Chekhov stories.

A dollar collapse is not likely yet.

Iraq is getting better. (H/T doug)

Paying the Danegeld

Wretchard offers a precis concerning what I have long considered to be an accurate view of the actuality of the violent arm of islam. I was particularly struck by this:

Thinking of al-Qaeda as a religion like Buddhism will take one down the wrong path. It's easier to understand it as a gang, with territories, local bosses, rackets, internal rivalries, and a secret culture which requires you to be "made". Al-Qaeda is in fact linked to gangs. It operates an actual narcotics trade in Afghanistan. It performs contract hits on behalf of clients and subcontracts hits to independent operators. It does everything gangs do and very little that religions, as we know it, undertake.

Although Wretchard is focusing upon Al Queada, he could have used the PLO or Hamas or Hezbollah in the same manner that the Camorra, Ndrangheta, Sacra Corona Unita and Mafia are interchangeable regarding intent. The common element is pecuniary gain for the leadership based upon extortion backed by the threat of violence (as opposed to the threat of disclosure).

It appears that the Shiite sheiks are as amenable as their Sunni cousins to the grant of autonomy within their fiefdoms backed by the money "necessary" to convert their gangs of hoodlums into recognized militia. The Iraqi government is paying off the sheiks in Anbaristan to the tune of $120 million, what will the Shia sheiks require to provide "peace"? After all, the oil fields lie within the area which they "protect".

I have some reservations concerning the adoption of "Gaza/West Bank - The Model" as a means "forward" in Iraq. Paying the Danegeld never really got rid of the Danes.